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Abstract 
When do parties use emotive rhetoric to appeal to voters? In this article, we argue that 
politicians are more likely to employ positive affect (valence) in their rhetoric to appeal to 
voters when parties are not ideologically distinct and when there is uncertainty about public 
preferences. To test these propositions, our paper uses well-established psycholinguistic 
affect dictionaries to generate scores from three time-series of political text:  British party 
manifestos (1900-2015) and annual party leaders’ speeches (1977-2014) as well as US 
Presidents’ State of the Union addresses (1880-2016). Our findings corroborate our 
expectations and have important implications for the study of party competition by 
illuminating the role of valence in way politicians communicate their policies. 
 
Keywords: Positive affect; Valence; Rhetoric; Polarization; Party competition; Speeches; Manifestos; 
Policy Pledges  
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Introduction 
How do parties use emotive rhetoric to appeal to voters? There is an extensive literature on 
how politicians use their policy positions strategically to maximize their electoral prospects 
(see e.g. Downs 1957). More recent work has also considered the importance of politicians’ 
non-policy, or valence, attributes (see Clark et al. 2004; 2009; Schofield, 2003; Adams, 1999; 
Ezrow, 2007; Adams et al., 2004; 2006). These non-policy characteristics, including candidate 
competence, campaigning skill and character traits, have been shown to matter to voters. 
One aspect of party competition, however, that has been largely ignored is the emotive 
content of politicians’ messages.  Yet, scholars as early as Aristotle have recognized the 
importance of emotions (pathos) in rhetoric alongside logic (logos) and credibility (ethos) 
(Aristotle, 1991). Indeed, research on emotions and cognition has shown that when 
individuals make decisions, they are influenced by affective appeals both in the way they 
process information and in the way they decide (Lazarus, 1991; Feldman, 1995; Damasio, 
1994;  Petty and Cacciopo, 1986; Lang, 1994; Bradley and Lang, 1999; Mondak and Huckfelt, 
2006; Petty and Briñol, 2014; Marcus et al., 2000; Brader, 2006). However, we only have a 
very limited understanding of how and when parties use positive affect in their rhetoric. If 
emotive language has the potential to influence political attitudes and behavior, then we 
should expect political actors to be strategic about its use.  
To further our understanding of the use of emotive language in party competition, 
we develop and test arguments about when politicians have strategic incentives to make use 
of positive affect (valence) to communicate their policy proposals.1 Empirically, we 
investigate this by analyzing prominent programmatic speeches from the UK and the US 
and we estimate the emotional tone of policy pledges or initiatives. Emotive rhetoric or 
valence is captured by measuring how positive, or pleasant, language is in high-profile 
                                                 
1 We use the terms positive affect, positivity, and valence interchangeably. 
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political texts and speeches. We employ the Affective Norms of English Words (hereafter 
ANEW) psycholinguistic dictionary (Bradley and Lang, 1999), which has been widely 
applied in other disciplines, to construct a measure that ranges from negative to positive. 
Using a dictionary-based approach has the distinct advantage of replicability. On top of that, 
the ANEW is a free-to-use and validated lexicon of emotive language that has been used in 
other disciplines. We apply this technique to different types of high-profile political texts: 
UK party election programs (manifestos) from 1900 to 2015, UK party leaders’ speeches 
from 1977 to 2014 and the American Presidents’ State of the Union (SOTU) addresses from 
1880 to 2015. As a robustness check, we successfully replicate our findings using the more 
commonly used Linguistic Inquirer and Word Count dictionary (LIWC). 
 We consider two factors that are likely to influence valence in party rhetoric. First, 
we argue that political actors have greater incentives to use positive emotive language to 
make their policy proposals more appealing to voters when parties’ policy positions are less 
distinct, i.e. when there is limited ideological polarization. Building on spatial theories of 
party competition and empirical research on dynamic policy shifts (e.g. Ezrow, 2007; Adams 
et al., 2004; 2006), we argue that when parties become less distinguishable in terms of their 
policy offerings, they utilize emotive rhetoric in order to differentiate themselves from their 
opponents on non-policy grounds (see Stokes 1963; Adams and Merrill, 2009; Adams, 
Merrill and Grofman, 2005; Bruter, Erikson and Strauss, 2010; Curini and Martelli, 2013).  
According to our theory, political actors increase the valence in their policy pledges to 
enhance the credibility of their commitment. Our second expectation relates to uncertainty 
about voter preferences. In line with formal models of party competition (e.g. Robertson, 
1976; Calvert, 1985; Budge, 1994; Wittman, 1977) we argue that party uncertainty regarding 
voter preferences can matter to the use of emotive language, since political parties are more 
likely to use affective language to present their policy offerings when more voters are 
undecided. In both cases, we consider positive emotive rhetoric as a tool to enhance the 
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appeal of policy pledges. We also have expectations about the economic and political 
context and we anticipate a healthier economy and incumbency to produce more positive 
rhetoric. 
 Many studies have examined strategic campaigning in terms of negativity and 
mudslinging in the context of TV ads, prime time TV debates and even campaign leaflets 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Lau and Pomper, 2002; Mutz, 2015; Milazzo, 2016; 
Hammond and Millazzo, 2017). This is, to our knowledge, one of the few studies that have 
attempted to measure strategic use of emotional appeals and, in particular, positive affect in 
political rhetoric. Although some research has focused on cross-national accounts of valence 
(in terms of elite scandals) (Abney et al., 2013; Clark, 2009; 2014; Clark and Leiter, 2014), this 
is the first study to examine the link between the use of valence in political rhetoric and the 
political context. Our analysis thus contributes to the literature on party competition and 
valence by demonstrating that emotive rhetoric is one of the tools parties use to differentiate 
themselves from other parties on a non-policy dimension (e.g. Adams and Merrill III, 2009) 
and by providing a more nuanced understanding of how politicians communicate with 
voters to enhance the credibility of their policy pledges. It also speaks to an emerging 
literature that considers sentiment in public speaking as a central feature of modern politics. 
The paper proceeds in the following way. We first motivate the importance of affect in 
the study of party competition and the theoretical underpinnings of our hypotheses. We 
then present our method of measuring positive affect in political rhetoric and visualize the 
data used in the paper. Thereafter, we present the empirical tests of our propositions that are 
accompanied with a series of robustness checks. The final section discusses the implications 
of our findings. 
 
Emotive Rhetoric and Party Competition 
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Party behavior has traditionally been analyzed using the Downsian model of party 
competition (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958). According to Downs (1957), political actors are 
office seeking and they occupy policy positions close to the median voter to win elections. 
Yet, Stokes (1963) in his subsequent critique of this exclusive emphasis on positional issues, 
proposed a model in which voters have preferences over non-policy characteristics, or 
valence issues, that are orthogonal to the policy dimension. Specifically, he defined valence 
issues as ‘‘those that merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is 
positively or negatively valued by the electorate’’ (Stokes, 1963: 373). In the existing 
literature, such non-policy valence issues have included candidate character traits (e.g. 
honesty and integrity) (Mondak, 1995; Stone and Simas, 2010, Abney et al., 2013; Clark, 2014; 
Clark and Leiter, 2014; Adams et al., 2011), competence (Clarke et al., 2004; 2009), and name 
recognition (Adams et al., 2011). Our work adds positive emotive rhetoric to this list of non-
policy valence attributes. 
While we know very little about the use of emotive rhetoric by parties, there is an 
emerging literature on the link between emotional cues and political persuasion that 
suggests that such rhetoric may alter the way citizens understand and evaluate (political) 
arguments. For instance, cognitive theories of emotion, which focus on the micro-
foundations of persuasion, suggest that two conditions increase persuasiveness; the strength 
of the argument and the emotional state of the decision maker (Petty and Cacciopo, 1986; 
Chaiken, 1987; Petty and Briñol, 2014). The key finding of this line of research is that 
individuals in a happy/pleasant state (as induced by experimental manipulation) are more 
likely to be persuaded independent of the strength of the argument (see e.g. Bless, Mackie 
and Schwarz, 1992; Sinclair, Mark and Clore, 1994; for a good overview see Griskevicius, 
Shiota and Neufeld, 2010). An important aspect of this literature is the fact that positive 
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emotion broadens cognitive processes for individuals (Strauss and Allen, 2006; 2008). 
According to other research, individuals exposed to positive stimuli should be expected to 
rely on prior dispositions (see Marcus et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the above literature only 
relates to individuals and how they receive persuasive messages. The primary focus of this 
article is the sender of the political message.  
How do political parties and candidates use positive affect in their policy pledges? 
We argue that positive affect is one tool that parties can employ to increase the appeal of 
their political message. Political speeches and manifestos are means of setting out a policy 
program that will appeal to voters (Fernadez-Vasquez, 2015; Becher, 2016). The emotive 
weight politicians attach to a policy is likely to increase the costs of not delivering it if they 
win office, since voters should consider the additional weight as a credible signal that this 
policy will be eventually implemented. It follows, therefore, that political parties will wish 
to portray these policies positively. By using a higher degree of positive affect in their 
rhetoric politicians can signal to voters that these policies are priority for their party. Studies 
have shown the relevance of emotions in human interactions. Frank (1988), for example, 
argues that in many social settings, expressing emotions can increase the persuasiveness and 
credibility of a given course of action.2 Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson (2006), 
experimentally show that negotiators who showed positive emotions were more likely to 
incorporate a future business deal in a negotiated contract and that, in an ultimatum setting, 
managers who expressed positive (as opposed to neutral or negative) emotions were more 
                                                 
2 Note that Frank (1989) discusses emotions that are considered negative (like e.g. anger), but he 
examines cooperative behavior in the context of credible threats. It follows that credible promises 
come with positive emotion. Perhaps, the only positive emotion analyzed in his thesis relates to love 
and how it is the prerequisite for marital contract.   
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likely to close a deal. By demonstrating these emotions, actors lend credibility to their 
promises and make them more persuasive. In the context of policy pledges, we thus argue 
that by increasing the affective tone of their policy pledges, politicians signal to voters that 
they will commit to their promises. 
The question is under what conditions that politicians are compelled to make greater 
use of positive affect. While political elites have general incentives to use emotive language 
to promote their policies, we argue that there are conditions under which they have greater 
reasons to do so. Following the literature on valence politics and polarization, we expect that 
the use of emotive rhetoric will be influenced by the distribution of political parties along 
the ideological continuum, i.e. the degree of ideological polarization (e.g. Adams, 1998; 
Adams, Merrill III and Grofman, 2005; Green and Hobolt, 2008; Bruter, Erikson and Strauss, 
2010). More specifically, we argue that parties will use positive emotive language to induce 
more enthusiasm for their platforms, especially when their policy offerings are very similar 
to their opponents. Although they promise similar policies, politicians may seek to portray 
themselves as the most credible and committed actor to deliver it by using more affective 
language. Consider, for example, a scenario where two parties are located in the center of 
the policy space. In this example, voters cannot meaningfully differentiate between the 
parties on policy grounds. Instead parties will use more positive emotive language to 
enhance the appeal of their commitment to deliver the policy.  
 Formal models investigating the interaction between ideological polarization and the 
non-policy dimension have arrived at similar expectations. In a model with endogenous 
non-policy attributes, Asworth and De Mesquita (2009) demonstrate that when policy 
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pledges converge, parties tend to invest on non-policy factors.3 Schofield (2003) also predicts 
that in the absence of policy differentiation, parties will rely on non-policy competition to 
win the election. In the empirical literature, Green and Hobolt (2008) have found that British 
voters rely more on evaluation of non-policy characteristics of parties, such as issue 
competence, when parties have converged ideologically (see also Bartle et al., 2011). Hence, 
building on both formal and empirical literature, we expect that an increase in party system 
polarization will bring about a decline in the need for parties to make emotional appeals. 
Conversely, party efforts to increase their positive affect in their manifestos will increase 
when the policy positions of the competing parties are close to one another.  Hence, this 
leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: When political parties offer less distinctive policy positions, they are more likely to use more 
positive emotive rhetoric than when their policy positions are more distinct. 
 
Our first hypothesis thus concerns the effect of the distribution of party positions on 
emotive rhetoric, but the distribution of voter preferences also matters. For vote-seeking 
parties, uncertainty about voters’ party choices is relevant to the content of their political 
messages. We would expect that parties are more incentivized to signal commitment to their 
                                                 
3 The spatial modeling literature produces mixed results, often due to the assumptions made about 
office or policy-seeking parties. In a model with policy-seeking parties and with endogenous valence 
being determined before choosing policy location, Serra (2010) shows that high valence comes with 
low polarization. In general the sequence of the game and the motivations of the party change the 
empirical predictions of the formal models. In addition to Serra (2010), Grosclose (2001) and 
Zakharov (2009) also start with parties deciding on the valence dimension and then choosing their 
policy platform. Schofield (2003) and Asworth and De Mesquita’s models begin with parties choosing 
their policies and then manipulating their valences. 
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policy pledges when voters are more undecided about who to vote for. The formal literature 
on party competition has shown that the non-policy dimension becomes more significant 
when there is uncertainty about where voters stand (see Adams et al. 2005). Building on this, 
and in line with what is known about the cognitive value of positive affect discussed above, 
we argue that if a significant proportion of voters are undecided about how they are going 
to vote, parties have a clear incentive to engage in positive emotive appeals since their policy 
pledges alone are insufficient to sway those voters (see Kosmidis and Xezonakis, 2010; 
Orriols and Martínez, 2014; Kosmidis, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2015). Parties, in effect, 
will be motivated to increase their non-policy (affective) appeals to enhance their chances of 
winning over these undecided votes (see Griskevicius, Shiota and Neufeld, 2010). In 
contrast, if parties are certain about the distribution of preferences in the electorate, then 
they can focus instead on appealing to the voters that would maximize their electoral 
performance by pledging their preferred policy. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: When a greater proportion of voters is undecided about which party to vote for, political 
parties are more likely to use positive emotive rhetoric. 
 
 The proportion of undecided voters varies significantly across countries and over 
time. In our study, we examine our hypotheses using data from both Britain and the US, 
since these provide considerable variation in party polarization and voter uncertainty. We 
discuss the data and methods used to test our hypotheses in the ensuing section. 
 
Measurement 
 
Dependent variable 
As we noted in the introductory section, we apply the Affective Norms of English Words 
dictionary (Bradley and Lang, 1999) to measure the positive affective tone in party rhetoric. 
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This dictionary offers the unique opportunity to produce an exogenous measure of 
emotionality that is not contaminated by partisan attitudes and political predispositions.4 
This measure is based on psycholinguistics and produces affect scores based on individual 
word scores for 2,500 unique English words that have been identified as having meaningful 
emotional content (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974; Russell, 1980; 1989; 1990; Belleza et al., 
1986; Bradley and Lang 1994). Participants of the ANEW study graded their reactions on a 1-
9 point scale along two semantic differentials that range from bad-good (Pleasure) and were 
given words as anchors to facilitate their scoring of different samples of words. For instance, 
the highest score of the Pleasure (or valence) dimension denoted feelings such as happiness, 
pleasure, satisfaction, contention and hope while at the other extreme words like unhappy, 
annoyed, dissatisfied, melancholic, despaired, or bored. The ANEW has the advantage of 
offering a continuous measure of affect, whereas other sentiment dictionaries like the LIWC 
opt for discrete operationalizations of affect.5  Moreover, the ANEW dictionary has been 
widely used in the study of emotion in language, as evidenced by the hundreds of citations 
of the original study.6 Dodds and Danforth (2010) have confirmed the validity of the 
aggregate affective scores produced by ANEW by comparing different types of text 
including songs by genre and the presidential State of the Union address. They conducted 
their analyses by using random subsamples of the ANEW dictionary and demonstrated the 
robustness of the method and the face validity of the scores. Despite the advantages, the 
ANEW dictionary has been rarely used in political science.7  
                                                 
4  ANEW is currently being validated in other languages (e.g. Redondo et al., 2007; Soares et al., 2012). 
5 As we show in the section on sensitivity analyses below, our findings are robust if we apply the 
LIWC dictionary instead. 
6 A Google Scholar search on the ANEW database returns more than 1500 citations. 
7 One exception is a study by Gonzalez-Bailon et al. (2012) who scored blog discussions and examined 
their correlation with tracking polls. Note also that Young and Soroka (2009) examined the 
relationship between a variety of sentiment dictionaries.   
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 The primary objective of this paper is to describe and explain variation in the level of 
valence in party political texts and speeches. To examine the strategic use of emotive 
rhetoric by politicians, we examine time-series of some of the most high-profile and studied 
political texts in the English language: British party manifestos and party leader speeches as 
well as US Presidents’ State of the Union (SOTU) addresses. To provide a better 
understanding of our empirical strategy to examine differences in positivity in political 
speeches and text, we can use the example of a speech delivered by Senator Barack Obama 
in the 2004 Democratic Convention in Chicago. We use an excerpt from this speech to 
demonstrate how we derive our final text scores:  
 
Tonight, we gather to affirm the greatness of our nation not because of the height of our skyscrapers, 
or the power [6.54] of our military [5.54], or the size of our economy; our pride [7.0] is based on a 
very simple premise, summed up in a declaration made over two hundred years ago: "We hold these 
truths [7.8] to be self-evident, that all men are created equal that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life [7.27], liberty [7.98] and the pursuit of 
happiness[7.96].” That is the true [7.8] genius [7.39] of America, a faith in simple dreams [7.14], an 
insistence on small miracles [8.6] 
 
Final Score= Sum[ANEWScore]/Number of ANEW Words=80.95/11, Final Score= 7.36  
 
The numbers in brackets represent the ANEW score for the particular word that appears in 
the dictionary. Following Dodds and Danforth (2010), we have weighed the text scores by 
the total number of ANEW words appearing in each text. The 7.36 score corresponds to the 
final score for this particular text. Compared to our other political texts this is an extremely 
positive document with many words that score high in affect (e.g. “miracles”, ”happiness”). 
Obama’s speech in 2004 would be the highest in terms of positivity and Bush’s 1990 SOTU 
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speech that marked the end of the Cold War would follow (6.57 on the original scale). But 
there is substantial variation across different speeches.   
 Figure 1 plots the valence score from 1880 until 2015. For analytical purposes we 
have rescaled the scores to vary from 0 to 100. The figure shows clearly that the speech 
delivered shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York unsurprisingly exhibit the 
lowest levels of positive affect (5.27 in the original scale). The speech delivered after the Fall 
of the Berlin Wall scores the highest (Bush Senior in 1990 with a score of 6.27). This coupled 
with the low and high levels of positive affect during and after the Second World War 
shows the general face validity of our measure and similar patterns are confirmed in our 
empirical analysis.8 
 
FIGURE 1: Positive emotion in US Presidential SOTUs, 1880-2015 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The SOTU speeches were collected from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
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We employ the same strategy for the British texts, only this time the texts we use are 
election programs (manifestos) and speeches. Manifestos are structured documents with 
specific goals and research has shown that they do set the tone of the election campaign (see 
Hoffenbert and Budge, 1992; Bara and Budge, 2001). However, the analysis of rhetoric 
through policy platforms is a rather conservative way to assess how parties induce positive 
affect during election campaigns. Although it is entirely plausible that manifestos give the 
affective tone that is maintained throughout the campaign, we also analyze speeches 
delivered annually by all party leaders during Party Conferences,9as these are prominent 
speeches that outlines the party platform and which attract a great deal of media attention. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Positive affective tone in UK Party Manifestos, 1900-2015  
 
 
In Figure 2 the x-axis represents election years and the y-axis the score of Positive Affective 
tone across all manifestos drafted from 1900 to 2015.10 Our measure is again rescaled to vary 
from 0 to 100 and varies both across time, parties and elections. The equivalent plot for the 
                                                 
9 They take place in September and October of every year. 
10 The plots are based on the ANEW dictionary. As we discuss below, the correlations of these scores 
with the equivalent measures from LIWC are very high. 
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leadership speeches can be found in Figure 3. With the exception of three speeches by the 
Liberals (late 1980s), we plot all the available leadership speeches as they were delivered in 
the annual party conferences. Unsurprisingly, the leadership speeches delivered 
immediately after 9/11 were the most negative speeches.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Positive affective tone in UK Leaders’ speeches in annual Party Conferences, 
1977-2015     
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Independent variables 
Next we turn to the explanatory variables used in the analysis of party rhetoric. To measure 
polarization, we first need a measure of party policy positions. We derive these using 
Wordscores (see Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Lowe, 2008), which is a scaling technique 
that extracts policy positions using benchmark documents.11 Most of the existing empirical 
work on party competition relies on party positions estimated by the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP) (see Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). However, the CMP 
started the manifesto analyses for elections that took place only after the Second World War. 
Relying on the CMP positional measure would mean that we would be unable to analyze 
more than 15 publicly available manifestos from the first half of the 20th century.12 The 
distinct advantage of the Wordscores approach is that it allows us to make use of a much 
longer time-series of manifestos and also enables us to compare the results from the 
manifestos to those from the leadership speeches. As reference documents in Wordscores 
model, we use the 1945 election for the 1900 to 2015 data set and the most recent election 
(2010) for our leadership speeches. Our robustness checks show that the choice of the 
reference text has minimal consequences for our Polarization measure and the inferences 
drawn from our statistical models.  
                                                 
11 We use the CMP as the anchors for our Wordscores policy positions. 
12 Although Wordscores is a useful tool to extract policy positions, it comes with several caveats 
regarding both the assumptions of the algorithm (see Lowe, 2008) as well as the content and face 
validity of the estimates (see Bruinsma and Gemenis, 2017). However, as we explain in text, it is not 
possible to use the Comparative Manifesto Project or expert surveys for the full data of our 
Manifestos. The problem is bigger when we have to deal with annual leadership speeches that have 
never been scored by experts.  In the Appendix we show that a CMP based measure of polarization 
produces similar results for the subset of the data. 
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To capture polarization in the party system, we use a weighted measure of party 
system dispersion that is based on Ezrow’s work on the topic (see Ezrow, 2007; Ezrow and 
Xezonakis, 2011). The variable is computed in the following way: 
 
Weighted Party System Dispersion =  
where, 
= the weighted mean of all the parties’ Left-Right ideological positions  
= the ideological position of party j. 
 
This specification of the polarization variable (the weighted mean portion of the equation) 
eliminates the bias that might be caused by positions taken by smaller parties (e.g. Labour 
party in the early 1900s and the Liberal party after the Second World War). For the 
American series we use a widely used measure of polarization that is based on 
DWNominate Scores of the American House and Senate that are based on roll-call voting 
(McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006). The Polarization measure in this case is the ideological 
difference between Democrats and Republicans across Congresses.  
 To measure uncertainty over party preferences we rely on measures of voting 
indecision. For the manifesto data we use all the available Gallup measures from 1959 until 
1997 and we complement it with IPSOS MORI for the remaining elections. We use the 
proportion of undecided respondents (Don’t Know) a month before the election as recorded 
in response to the typical vote intention question “If there was a general election tomorrow, how 
would you vote?” item. We follow the same strategy for the Conference speeches13. Since 
                                                 
13 We use the measure as it is recorded in September of each year (i.e. a month before the Party 
Conference takes place). 
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vote intentions measures are not common in US polls, we use the proportion of 
respondents who are unsure about how well the President is doing his job, as collected by 
Gallup every month.14  
 
Model Specification and Analyses of Positive Affect 
Our main propositions on party system polarization is that a reduction in the distinctiveness 
of party policy positions from one election to another will bring about an increase in the 
positivity score, and vice versa. We also include a set of control variables. We control for the 
Party of the Prime Minister to account for the anticipated higher level of positive emotion in 
incumbent parties. We do so, because we expect that incumbent political actors will have to 
use more positive language to showcase their record in office. We also add economic 
controls to capture the economic context (Growth), since we would expect that better 
economic conditions will lead to greater use of positive affect. Finally, we include a lagged 
dependent variable to take dynamics into account. 
 Table 1 reports regression coefficients for three models. The first model is a 
regression model testing the Polarization hypothesis using the election-year data (1900-
2015). In the second column, we replicate this model with the annual leaders’ speeches and 
in the third one we move beyond the British context and we analyze the same hypothesis 
using the annual State of the Union Addresses. To facilitate interpretation, we have rescaled 
the dependent variable to vary from 0-100 and the polarization measure to vary from 0 to 10. 
The results show that the Polarization predictor exerts a significant negative effect on the 
level of emotive language, in line with our first hypothesis, and this is the case across the 
three models. In substantive terms the coefficients in both models suggest that, holding 
everything constant, a standard deviation increase in Polarization (SDManifestos=2.5, 
                                                 
14 We use the January reading of the survey question.   
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SDLeaders=2.7, SDSOTUs=2.4) brings about a decrease in positive emotion of around 3, 4 and 6 
points on the 100 point scale, respectively.15  
 The coefficients for our controls show that incumbency has a strong and significant 
influence on positive emotion with incumbent parties being on average more positive in 
their rhetoric. Looking at Columns 1 and 2, incumbents draft more positive manifestos by 
approximately 7 points. This is an anticipated finding that lends credibility to our outcome 
measure. Equally convincing is the positive effect of Economic Growth across the three 
models. This suggests that, on average, in good economic times politicians use more positive 
language to communicate their policies. The model specification in Column 3 warrants 
further discussion because it is essentially a time series regression model. From the lagged 
variable, it is clear that the outcome does not contain a unit root. Breusch-Godfrey tests 
across several lag levels of the residuals suggest autocorrelation is not a concern and we can 
thus be confident in our inferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Models predicting Positive Affect from Polarization across Political Texts 
  
UK Party 
Manifestos 
UK Party 
Leaders US SOTUs 
                                                 
15 Although it is not straightforward to evaluate how strong an effect is in substantive terms (that is 
how different is rhetoric once positivity decreases by, say, 6%) it is crucial to compare this finding 
with results reported in papers of party competition using content analysis. In some key studies in the 
literature, the shifts in ideology are half of what we report here (see e.g. Adams and Topcu, 2009; 
Topcu, 2009).  
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 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Positive 
Affectt-1 0.096 -0.051 0.208 
 (0.112) (0.100) (0.156) 
Polarization -1.282* -1.368** -2.482** 
 (0.716) (0.614) (1.177) 
Econ. Growth 0.726* 1.356* 0.936*** 
 (0.429) (-0.813) (0.329) 
Incumbency 6.484* 7.287** - 
 (3.441) (3.663) - 
Constant 64.083*** 58.892*** 58.319*** 
 (8.439) (6.572) (13.184) 
        
N 87 106 35 
R2 0.107 0.102 0.606 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100 and measures positive affect 
in each text. The polarization measure ranges from 0 to 10 and it is 
measured using Wordscores for columns 1 and 2 and DWNominate for 
column 3. For columns 1 and 2 we employ a random effects estimator. In 
the Appendix (Table A.1) we report results from a fixed effects estimator. 
In the same table we show the results without the lagged dependent 
variable. The model in Column 3 includes dummies for elections and 
second presidential terms. Because our Polarization measure is by 
Congress we only have recorded measures every second year of our 
dataset.  
 
  
 In Table 2, we test our hypothesis about the effect of uncertainty about voter 
preferences. Our expectation is that greater uncertainty encourages politicians to use more 
emotive language. In these models, we include a public opinion measure of the aggregate 
level of voter uncertainty, that is the percentage of voters being undecided about which 
party to vote for (we can only include elections from 1959 onwards). We replicate this model 
specification for the Leaders’ Speeches specification (presented in column 2) where we use 
the percent ‘undecided’ as recorded by IPSOS-MORI during the pre-conference period from 
1977 to 2014, whereas in Column 3 of Table 2 we test this hypothesis using the SOTU data. 
Our model in Column 3 also includes dummy for the War on Terror SOTU Address and 
dummies for election years and presidential second terms. As with the UK models, we also 
control for economic conditions.  
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 Starting with the effects of public opinion, we find a significant effect for the 
%Undecided measure, which suggests that valence increases with more undecided voters in 
the electorate. The coefficients (βUndecided=0.670/βUndecided=0.493) for both series are 
statistically significant. Note, however, that the model using manifestos is only based on 14 
observations per party and when including the covariates the degrees of freedom are much 
lower. For this reason, we do not include a lagged dependent variable and we keep it the 
same with the other two models.16 As in Table 1 our controls remain statistically significant 
and they are correctly signed. However, we fail to find an effect when using the American 
SOTUs. Across these models our measure of Polarization exerts a negative and statistically 
significant effect on Positive emotion. The more distant the Democrats and the Republicans 
are in terms of ideology the lesser the volume of Positive Affect in the President’s SOTU 
speech. More generally, this represents a conservative test of our theory because the 
institutional characteristics of the US system (fixed terms, separation of powers) discourage 
presidents from focusing on partisan interests in their SOTU addresses.  
The findings from columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 suggest that when parties cannot 
convince voters purely on the basis of ideology and policy proposals, they will invest 
greater effort in highlighting their non-policy characteristics and, in line with Hypothesis 2, 
they will seek to highlight their commitment to the policy proposal by using more positive 
language. Across those models, the impact of Polarization is still strong, significant and 
robust.  
 An alternative explanation of the results reported on Table 2 is that because the 
proportion of undecideds plausibly increases in times of ideological convergence the effects 
we observe can be related to Polarization rather than valence. This is the primary reason why 
we include the independent effect of Polarization in Table 2, yet testing the exact causal 
                                                 
16 The results are identical for columns 2 and 3 when we include the lagged dependent variable. The 
same applies for Table 1; the results are robust when we don’t include the lagged dependent variable. 
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chain is rather difficult with the data at hand. To be sure the correlations between indecision 
and polarization are very close to zero for all three datasets we examine. Overall, the results 
broadly support our theoretical propositions. In the next section, we show that these 
findings are robust to alternative measurements and model specifications.  
 
TABLE 2: Models predicting Positive Affect from Polarization and %Undecideds 
 
  
UK Party 
Manifestos 
UK Party 
Leaders 
US 
SOTUs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Polarization -2.550** -1.036*** -2.637** 
 (1.167) (0.370) (1.225) 
Econ.Growth 1.482* 1.350* 0.952*** 
 (0.862) (0.777) (0.334) 
%Undecided 0.670* 0.493*** -0.163 
 (0.349) (0.191) (0.298) 
Incumbency 5.257* 7.546* - 
 (3.009) (4.435) - 
Constant 63.072*** 45.926*** 60.339*** 
 (6.604) (7.831) (13.849) 
        
N 45 109 35 
R2 0.186 0.116 0.61 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100 and measures positive affect 
in each text. The polarization measure ranges from 0 to 10 and it is 
measured using Wordscores for columns 1 and 2 and DWNominate for 
column 3. The %Undecided measure corresponds to the IPSOS 
MORI/Gallup vote intention question. For Column 3 the %Undecided 
corresponds to the presidential approval item as measured by Gallup. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
The previous analyses show that are results are fairly robust across contexts and type 
of political text (speeches and manifestos). Moreover, we find similar patterns regardless of 
the specific methods used to code of the main independent variable since both Wordscore 
estimates in the UK and DWNominate scores in the American case show similar results.17 In 
                                                 
17 In the Appendix (Table A.2) we present models that estimate the same relationships using entirely 
different measurement strategies for the key variables. For example, we present models of UK Party 
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this section we examine the sensitivity our findings to alternative measurements and model 
specifications. 
  Given the long period of investigation, one concern may be that there has been a 
change in the vocabulary that affects our measurements. Although the lexicon analyzes 
words we use every day and are present in political speeches, it might well be that emotive 
language was different in 1910 or 1920 compared to 2015. Alternatively, it might well be that 
different speechwriters or different party leaders have different baseline level of affect and 
this might drive some of the effects we observe. To test whether our hypothesis about 
Polarization holds, we incorporate time effects to entertain the possibility that different eras 
correspond to different meanings in the affective content of English words. We thus add 
time dummies in the right hand side of the equation.  The model specification remains the 
same and the results are reported on Table 3. As it is clear from the entries in Table 3 the 
results are robust and Polarization exerts a negative and significant effect on valence.18 
TABLE 3. Party and Time Fixed Effects Predicting Positive Affective Tone from Polarization 
 
  UK Manifestos  UK Leaders  
  (1) (2) 
      
Polarization -2.685** -4.529*** 
 (0.387) (1.334) 
                                                                                                                                                       
manifestos that use an alternative coding of the outcome variable. Instead of weighting the scores by 
the number of ANEW words, it weighs by the total number of words. Rather than estimating 
Polarization using Wordscores it uses the relevant CMP scores for all post-WWII elections.  It also 
uses the BES measure of %Undecided that corresponds to timing of voting decision (“When did you 
decide how to vote?”). Finally, rather than using economic growth, it estimates the estimates the 
economic effects using the rate of Unemployment. Both our hypotheses are confirmed and 
Unemployment exerts the expected – negative - influence.  
18 The inferences are the same with and without the lagged dependent variable. The choice of finally 
including it was guided by the literature that supports its inclusion when temporal dimension is 
much larger than the unit effects. The results are also similar when we use bootstrapped standard 
errors to test for internal validity. 
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Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Endogenous Lag Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 87 106 
R2 0.451 0.531 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Our next robustness check relates to the ANEW dictionary and how generalizable our affect 
scores are. As we explained in the Measurement section, we apply a measure of affect that is 
based on 2500 words and were measured using a continuous scale denoting pleasantness 
(Valence). Although prominent in the study of Affect, other sentiment dictionaries have also 
been used in the literature. To check whether our results are only evident with the ANEW 
measure, we replicate Table 1 with the equivalent aggregate measure of the Linguistic 
Inquirer and Word Count (LIWC) Sentiment dictionary. The LIWC has a very similar setup; 
2500 words are scored and the software gives the proportion of positive and negative words 
in each document. Our score is then the natural logarithm of the ratio between positive and 
negative words. Higher values on this scale denote more positive affect in each text. Once 
again, the final measure is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. As it is evident in Figure 4 that 
visualizes the relationship by political party, the produced ANEW scores correlate highly 
with the LIWC. Moving to our replication, as the results in Table 4 show, the estimates are 
very similar to those in Table 1. Polarization has a negative and significant effect on positive 
affect as measured by LIWC. 
 
FIGURE 4: Correlation between ANEW and LIWC by party 
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TABLE 4: Models of Positive Affect across political texts using the LIWC Sentiment 
Dictionary 
 
  
UK Party 
Manifestos 
UK Party 
Leaders 
US 
SOTUs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Positive Affectt-1 0.235** 0.106 0.121 
 (0.107) (0.144) (0.171) 
Polarization -1.768** -0.868* -3.135** 
 (0.870) (0.510) (1.369) 
Econ. Growth 0.000 -0.031 1.055** 
 (0.524) (0.780) (0.388) 
Constant 49.010*** 55.728*** 68.357*** 
 (7.953) (9.828) (15.149) 
        
N 87 106 35 
R2 0.203 0.041 0.390 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100 and measures positive affect in 
each text. The polarization measure ranges from 0 to 10 and it is measured 
using Wordscores for columns 1 and 2 and DWNominate for column 3. 
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Our analyses so far have shown the robustness of our findings using a variety of 
estimators, coding of the key variables but also alternative measurement techniques to 
capture valence. In the Online Appendix, we offer additional robustness checks related to 
alternative measures of Polarization (party ideology taken from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project), an alternative recoding of the dependent variable and alternative measures of 
economic conditions (i.e. Unemployment). The results we present lend credibility both to 
our theoretical expectations as well as the predictive validity of our valence measure.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined when politicians use valence or positive affect in their 
rhetoric.  More specifically, we drawn upon recent work that examines the trade-offs 
between policy differentiation and endogenous party efforts to increase their valence (Serra, 
2010; Meirowitz, 2008; Ashworth and De Mesquita, 2009) and the role of uncertainty in party 
decision-making (Robertson, 1976; Budge, 2001, Calvert, 1985; Adams, Merrill III and 
Grofman, 2005) to explain the conditions under which parties have greater incentives to 
employ positive affect in their rhetoric. The results favor our proposition that parties are less 
likely to engage in rhetorical pathos when they are politically distinct and when they are 
certain about voters’ partisan preferences. In contrast, we show that when the party system 
offers similar policy offerings and when a large proportion of the electorate is undecided, 
party elites make greater use of valence to enhance the appeal of their pledges.  
 These findings are robust across political texts that vary both in scope and context. 
Our texts are scored using well known and widely validated psycholinguistic dictionaries 
(e.g. see Dodds and Danforth, 2010; Redondon et al., 2007; Soares et al., 2012). These 
dictionaries are context- independent and thus the subjects used to score the words do not 
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have politics in their mind when evaluating the ANEW sample of words or any other 
widely used affect lexicon. This makes our statistical tests a conservative test of our 
hypotheses. For this paper, we have shown that the replication with other widely used 
dictionaries (like the LIWC) lends additional credibility to our findings. Future work should 
explore the possible advantages of using crowd funded lexicons to measure sentiment in 
structured political texts. Also, supervised algorithms have shown promise in measuring 
sentiment in social media, political communications and micro-blogging. We do feel that 
this is a great avenue for the improvement of political communications measures and 
estimates.  
 There are some other caveats that warrant discussion; we have made a very 
important assumption throughout. We have considered political rhetoric at the macro level 
and have discounted different topics in each political text. Clearly, different parties own 
different issues and we might expect heterogeneous effects that are not possible to be 
captured with our analytical strategy.  Moreover, our analysis has been limited to two 
English-speaking democracies.  The ANEW dictionary is currently being validated in many 
other languages which may facilitate future large-N comparative analyses. Additional 
country cases can shed light to more mechanisms and allow to incorporate Comparative 
Manifesto Project data to measure party policy polarization. Moreover, by leveraging more 
countries we could also examine polarization at the voter level but also voter uncertainty 
regarding party positioning.   
Our work has potentially broader implications for the study of party competition 
and democracy. There is a burgeoning literature that focuses not just on the policy positions 
of parties but also on non-policy attributes (see Grosclose, 2001; Serra, 2010; Adams and 
Merrill, 2009; Clark, 2014; Stone and Simas, 2010). One such attribute is the appeal to 
emotions. The way political parties present their policies matters.  Political elites aim to 
convince voters and when they offer similar solutions to their problems, they pursue 
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strategies demonstrating that they are better able to deliver the proposed policy.  As 
Aristotle argued, pathos is a necessary tool for effective persuasion. 
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Appendix 
 
 
TABLE A.1: Regression models predicting Positive Affect from Polarization using random effects estimator 
without endogenous lag (Columns 1 and 4) and party fixed effects estimators with and without lags (Columns 
2,3,5 and 6). 
 
  RE FE FE RE FE FE 
 
UK Party 
Manifestos 
UK Party 
Manifestos 
UK Party 
Manifestos 
UK Party 
Leaders 
UK Party 
Leaders 
UK Party 
Leaders 
              
Positive 
Affectt-1 - - 0.042 - - -0.087 
 - - (0.113) - - -0.102 
Polarization -1.349* -1.347* -1.314* -1.166** -1.176** -1.366** 
 (0.691) (0.695) (0.704) (0.592) (0.589) (0.611) 
Econ.Growth 0.736* 0.737* 0.733* 1.297 1.332* 1.436* 
 (0.417) (0.419) (0.422) (0.800) (0.797) (0.811) 
Incumbency  7.370** 7.559** 7.464** 7.537** 5.560 5.359 
 (3.504) (3.569) (3.598) (3.555) (4.104) (4.187) 
Constant 70.676*** 70.609*** 67.637*** 54.793*** 55.455*** 61.356*** 
 (4.110) (2.761) (8.517) (3.986) (4.020) (6.737) 
              
N 90 90 87 109 109 106 
R2 0.0982 0.0981 0.103 0.0933 0.0910 0.0981 
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TABLE A.2: Regression models predicting Positive Affect from Polarization and %Undecideds using 
alternative coding of the outcome variable and alternative measures of the key covariates. 
 
 
  
UK Party 
Manifestos 
  
    
PolarizationCMP -0.102** 
 (0.041) 
%Undecided BES 0.519** 
 (0.227) 
Incumbency -0.023 
 (1.286) 
Unemployment -1.673* 
 (0.981) 
Constant 68.889*** 
 (2.848) 
    
N 39 
R2 0.284 
Note: Standard Errors in 
Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1,  
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TABLE A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Model Specification appearing in main text 
Manifesto Data          Mean        SD       Min        Max 
Valence                      70.02         15.13           0        100 
Polarization                2.87           2.51            0         10 
Growth                       .087           4.10         -8.9        8.6 
Undecided                 22.68          7.26           11     34.16 
Leadership Data 
Valence                       55.02       18.24            0        100 
Polarization                  4.88          2.80           0         10 
Growth                           2.28          2.11          -5.2      5 
Undecided                  16.43          5.42           4         26 
US SOTUs 
Valence                      54.24         15.69          0        100 
Polarization                4.73          2.44           0         10 
Growth                          .57         12.64        -4.19      5.08 
Undecided                  12.0         7.72           2           43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
